@BushidoToken Threat Intel

  What Happened: On 10 May 2026, the UK-based firm Arup Group was listed as a victim on the Tor data leak site of FulcrumSec.   On their Tor data leak site, FulcrumSec stated that they have exposed 700GB of GitHub repos and 2TB of Azure and AWS S3 cloud, plus database backups. Other types of data the adversary claims to have stolen includes Neuron BMS client databases, Odoo ERP data, A66 landowner files, Apple code-signing certificates with plaintext passwords, a Google Cloud Platform (GCP) project with production payment gateway credentials, and the source code of ArupCompute and Oasys.   The FulcrumSec operators also claimed to have spent over half a year analysing the data and went through “email correspondence” with the company before publishing the stolen data. On the victim post, FulcrumSec wrote a detailed incident breakdown. In it, they stated they gained initial access in September 2025 via a GitHub personal access token found hardcoded in a JavaScript file on a ...

  Introduction The Ransomware Tool Matrix continues to be a useful passion project that I am happy to continue maintaining. One piece of common feedback I've received for the Ransomware Tool Matrix was that individuals would like to contribute their observations to it, but do not have public links they can cite (such as a formal blog post on a company website). Therefore, I came up with a plan to make a reporting template to help with this. What are Community Reports? Individuals can now share what tools they have seen various ransomware groups, affiliates, or initial access brokers (IABs) use via the new Community Report Template. The level of detail provided is the contributor's choice. The more verifiable information shared, the increased level of reliability and credibility. You can view the current list of Community Reports on GitHub  here . Why the need for Community Reports? Most of the sources of CTI about ransomware TTPs comes from open source reports by organisation...

  I recently came across an interesting campaign that is using fake websites to distribute malware. Although this TTP is not new, it seems to be on the rise. Anecdotally, I've seen it in multiple cases in 2023 more so than before. It's difficult to quantify without doing extensive research, it is something for other analysts to be aware of more at least.  A suspected Russia-based cybercriminal decided to clone the website of a legitimate open-source desktop app (see here ) called Steam Desktop Authenticator (SDA) which is simply a convenient desktop version of the mobile authenticator app. However, for that convenience, there is a price - impersonation scams and account hijacking. The GitHub repo of the SDA app also has a warning to other about the fake versions floating around. Figure 1: Warning from the real Steam Desktop Authenticator site The threat actors distributing the fake version of SDA use two techniques that are effective when paired together: Site Cloning and Typo...

  Legitimate third-party Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS) providers are becoming increasingly leveraged by threat actors for phishing and malware deployment. PaaS providers such as cloud instances, marketing platforms, content delivery networks (CDN), and dynamic DNS servers have been weaponised for a range of malicious activities. One of the key benefits is that they can be used to  evade detection systems. This is due to the decreased likelihood of these being pre-emptively blocked because of established levels of trust and legitimate usage.  Many of these types of malware and phishing campaigns also combine the use of multiple platforms simultaneously, making these particularly difficult for human analysts and automated systems to identify and malicious activity. The research in this blog details how cybercriminals l everage these systems as credential harvesting pages, payload hosting sites, redirector links, C&C servers, "dead drop resolvers", and for data exfiltrati...

  A “dead drop” is a well-known espionage tactic of passing items or information between two parties using secret locations. The two parties never meet and any sign of communication is concealed. This tactic is commonly used by intelligence officers to interact with their assets in the field to avoid any suspicious meetings or either caught talking to each other. For decades, intelligence agencies have used dead drops. Two infamous double agents from the CIA and FBI - Aldrich Ames and Robert Hanssen respectively - both used dead drops to supply information to their handlers from the Soviet Union. Cyber adversaries have also come to adapt this technique into their espionage campaigns. However, instead of a human source, state-backed computer network operations (CNOs) have leveraged legitimate services for covert communications or so-called “dead drop resolvers”.  In October 2019, ESET Research disclosed a report on Operation Ghost Dukes which detailed the activities of an APT...