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Showing posts from 2020

Operational Security Tips and Tricks

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For my last blog of 2020, I wanted to share a short checklist for users and researchers to keep themselves secure on the internet. Many attackers cast a wide net and many of those that fail the basics get caught. Hopefully this guide will help those on the path to Operational Security (OPSEC): Social Media: Set social media accounts (e.g. Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, Tiktok) to private. Avoid using your real name when creating accounts. Avoid using identifiable personal pictures for profile pictures and cover pictures. Leave bio details blank and avoid sharing identifiable information. Do not check-in to locations or share your location for social media posts. Have a vetted list of friends/contacts that you permit to view your social media content.  Finally, personnel who work in cleared positions may often ask family members not to share pictures of you and prevent tagging.  Personal Security (PERSEC): Use more than one email account - ideally one for critical services like ...

Analysis of Meyhod JavaScript Web Skimmers

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  A new web skimmer, dubbed Meyhod, has been disclosed by RiskIQ. The malware (named after a typo in the code) appeared in October on several e-commerce sites, including the hair treatment company Bosley and the Chicago Architecture Center (CAC). While investigating the attacker's domain (jquerycloud[.]com) a bit further and other potential victims from this campaign were uncovered some months ago. This includes Doves Farm UK, The Fruit Company, Customer Earth Promos, and - due to the file names - potentially iCanvas or TFC: Active compromise of dovesfarm.co.uk: Skimmer 1: Identifier - sClass="yeikyd" - 'dovesfarm.js' (available here ) Skimmer 2: Identifier - sClass="frydbt" - 'icanvas.js' (available here ) Skimmer 3: Identifier - sClass="bfiyad" - 'tfc.js' (available here ) Skimmer 1 - Listener: Skimmer 2 and 3 - Listener: Skimmed Data: RC4 encryption: Data collected: Credit Card Number, Card Holder Name, CVV, expiry day, mont...

The Game of Attribution

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  In 1937, one of the world’s most authoritative art historians, Abraham Bredius, was approached by a lawyer on behalf of a Dutch family estate to inspect a painting of a Christ and the Disciples at Emmaus (pictured above). Bredius dedicated many years of his life studying the artwork of Johannes Vermeer. After inspecting the painting, he wrote that it is not only a Vermeer, but one the greatest pieces Vermeer ever created. Han Van Meegeren, a mediocre Dutch artist, had in fact forged the work of Vermeer. The above piece was sold during WWII to Nazi Field-Mashal Hermann Goering. Van Meegeren was charged as a Nazi collaborator, but claimed he was national hero. This was because he traded the forgery for 200 original Dutch paintings seized by Goering at the beginning of the war.  To fool Abraham Bredius, the 83 year old art historian whose words were taken as gospel, Van Meegeren had to lay as many clues (or false flags) as he could. This involved making a new painting look like...

Analysis of the threats targeting Point of Sale systems

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  Background A point of sale (POS) system refers to the critical piece of software used by customers to execute a payment for goods or a service. This also includes the physical devices in stores, where POS terminals and systems are used to process card payments. These are often the primary targets of financially motivated organised cybercrime groups (also known as eCrime advanced persistent threats). Successful intrusion of a POS system can lead to the theft of vast amounts of financial data from customers. This can be used for immediate gain or sold on underground markets for fraud. A combination of hard-to-detect data-exfiltration malware; legacy hardware - which is difficult to patch; and general OS vulnerabilities, mean that this particular threat is common and can be difficult to defend against. Organised Cybercrime APT groups such as FIN6, FIN7, and FIN8 are currently some of the most significant threats to large retailers, restaurant chains, hotels, the leisure industry, an...

Gathering Intelligence on the Qakbot banking Trojan

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Background:  The Qakbot banking Trojan is one of the top-tier malware families on the current threat landscape. It is distributed in mass spam campaigns, steals confidential information, and has also provided access to ransomware operators. Preventing and detecting this threat has become a priority for many organisations as a successful infection can lead to a costly cyber incident. In this blog, I aim to share more information on this malware, provided by open sources, and highlight the intelligence gathering process it takes to combat this threat. Qakbot (also known as Quakbot or Qbot) has been around since 2008. It has targeted the customers of various financial institutions worldwide. While Qbot's targeting has mostly remained the same - with the aim of stealing bank details and enabling wire fraud - its propagation methods have changed across various campaigns. Despite its age, Qakbot still remains a significant threat with established connections in the organised cybercr...